sir-alex-ferguson

There are certain supporters and pundits who paint Sir Alex Ferguson as an angry, old man who shouts a lot to get results. Such lazy depictions are, frankly, dead wrong. Consider this very simple ontological argument; if the Scot were such a simple-minded manager, would he have lasted this long at Manchester United?

United’s gradual and painful assimilation to four-band systems such as 4-3-3 and 4-5-1 has been credited by fans to Carlos Queiroz. After all, the barren period at United coincided with the Portuguese’s arrival. Given that the former Real Madrid manager is famous for his striker-less experiments during his days as Portugal’s youth manager, it probably is true that the radical experiments that took place between 2006 and 2008 were instigated by Queiroz – but it is not true that he brought about the shift to four-band systems.

For one, Ferguson started the shift a year before the former Portugal manager came to Old Trafford. Queiroz arrived in 2002 but it was in 2001 that Juan Sebastian Veron was purchased. With Veron and Roy Keane at the base, the former Aberdeen manager played Paul Scholes or Ryan Giggs off Ruud Van Nistelrooy in distinctly 4-2-3-1 ish system.
The Guardian’s season guide to 09/10 predicted that United would utilize 4-4-1-1 – Ferguson’s “love of his sporting life.”

Indeed, Sir Alex Ferguson argued, in an interview conducted by Gialuca Vialli, that he never used the traditional 4-4-2 during his time at Manchester United. The statement is not as outrageous as it sounds – for example, United’s 4-4-2 this season has been anything but traditional.

Ferguson’s first great team, despite being labeled as a 4-4-2, played in a distinctly four-band system. Keane and Paul Ince sat deep with Giggs and Andrei Kanchelskis placed higher on the pitch than their nominal wide midfielder positions called for. Mark Hughes led the line with Eric Cantona off him. Cantona wasn’t a second forward – he floated around too much. One may justifiably argue that this is all matter of semantics but the Frenchman was more a trequartista than a forward.

Even teams that looked like 4-4-2 never really matched the traditional kind. The second great Ferguson side that won the Champions League in Nou Camp is probably the closest the Scot got to using the traditional 4-4-2 model. Even then, the team always featured a striker who dropped deep, a la Dwight Yorke. Also with David Beckham playing deeper than Giggs, the system at times looked more like a lopsided 4-3-3 than a 4-4-2.

Why has Ferguson been this obsessed with four-band systems? After all, 4-4-2 has plenty of high-profile supporters. Arrigo Sacchi and Arsène Wenger are both fans of the system – they argue that, with intense pressing, the formation dominates the pitch in the most symmetric fashion.

There are many tactical issues with playing 4-4-2 that have already been discussed by this column and by many others. It is also worth noting that intense pressing is extremely hard. It is physically exhausting – even Barcelona cannot keep up the pressure throughout the game. The pressing game also requires a high workload on the training ground – Arrigo Sacchi’s great Milan side disintegrated as star players simply became fed up with the workload.

A big problem – if not the problem – is finding the right players. Four midfielders must have great engines; they must run from box-to-box, providing presence all over the pitch. Fitting in wingers to the wide spots is possible perhaps but finding box-to-box central midfielders is much harder task.

In continental Europe, where 4-4-2 has largely been discarded, there are almost no players that fit the description. Players who are used to more specialized roles find it extremely difficult to play box-to-box. Even in England, midfielders coming through have been brought up in the continental fashion – Jack Wilshere, for example, does not play like the Scholes of old.

The recent rumors about Javier Pastore, like many other ‘reports,’ are not conclusive but United’s interest in the player is genuine – the Reds attempted to buy the player before he went to Italy. United’s interest – disregarding finance for the time being – is interesting, given Sir Alex’ infatuation with 4-2-3-1.

In American football, the “offense” and the “defense” form a line of scrimmage. The offensive line protects the passer, usually the quarterback, and clears the way for runners. Runners, usually receivers positioned wide, carry the ball forward. Despite the prevalent perception, Sir Alex Ferguson is quite a tactician. He has – perhaps anticipating upcoming European games – revamped the 4-5-1 that Manchester United has used in tough games. Indeed, Ferguson’s 4-5-1 is very reminiscent of Gridiron.

In Ferguson’s system two central midfielders, usually Anderson and Darren Fletcher, charge forward and engage opposition midfielders. Paul Scholes or Michael Carrick plays the deep-lying playmaking role – aided by the extra space afforded by the two midfield runners. The ‘quarterback’ often passes to one of the wingers. Wingers carry the biggest creative load in the system – they have to either make the defense splitting balls to the lone forward, usually Wayne Rooney, or run with the ball and score.

However, wingers are aptly aided by Rooney, with the former Evertonian playing the ‘false nine’ role. A false nine is a striker who drops deep from the nominal number nine position. Such movements can be very deadly as an opposition centre-back or two can be dragged out of position. Should a centre-back follow Rooney deep, United’s wingers then have room for maneuver. Even if opposition centre-backs are disciplined in their positioning, Rooney then links with the Reds’ midfielders and helps maintain possession – allowing United’s defence to creep up and help out.

This variant on Ferguson’s 4-5-1 has worked well in home games against Arsenal and Manchester City this season and is likely to be used in a tough away game against Olympique de Marseille in the coming week.

It’s not the first time Ferguson has experimented this season – a prototype to the new system was also used in away games against Birmingham City and Blackpool, although the attempt failed miserably, despite a win and a draw. The two failed attempts can perhaps be written off as an unfortunate, but natural, consequence of any experiment.

The new system does have few glaring weaknesses though. One obvious fault is predictability. The plan: Fletcher and Anderson make forward runs and keep opposition midfielders occupied; Scholes or Carrick pass to Nani, Ryan Giggs, Ji-Sung Park or AntonioValencia; Rooney drops deep to create space; the winger tries to score. However, unless Rooney comes into the goal-scoring form of last season, the new 4-5-1 will remain far too predictable. The opposition can simply sit deep and deny space.

Another weakness is the burden placed on the deep-lying playmaker. With Carrick in poor form and Scholes no longer able to cope with a fast-pressing game, the ‘quarterback’ in the new tactic can easily be nipped in the bud. In the recent Manchester derby, Sir Alex protected Scholes by playing John O’Shea instead of Rafael. Indeed, the formation stifles United’s full-backs.

With Fletcher and Anderson making frequent forward runs, Evra and Rafael must help protect the Reds’ deep-lying playmaker. In addition to the defensive role, they also have to motor forward and provide auxiliary width as wingers cut inside.

Theoretically, two full-backs can help out the quarterback and then motor forward as the quarterback drops deep to form a temporary back three as necessary. It remains to be seen whether the abstract thinking can work on the pitch of course. United’s full-backs will be more conservative away from home but this instruction ensures an already predictable system is even more readable.

Moreover, Sir Alex appears very concerned with his new 4-5-1. For example, in the recent FA Cup tie against Crawley Town he deployed the new system – probably to fine tune the formation. Events changed the match though – the 69-year-old Scot introduced Rooney and played 4-2-3-1 in the second half. But Gabriel Obertan and Bébé’s poor form, in addition to the Da Silva twins’ injuries, rendered United narrow and allowed Crawley to take the initiative.

Disastrous, and frankly painful to watch as the match might have been, the interesting thing was the Scot changing United’s formation during the interval. In using 4-2-3-1, Ferguson added another midfielder alongside the quarterback, providing extra protection and allowing the full-backs to bomb forward more easily.

It is quite clear that Sir Alex counts his full-backs as a major source of creativity. It is also palpable that the United manager is still unconvinced by the new 4-5-1.